Protective behavior in matching models

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80002-8zbMath0834.90003OpenAlexW2094191344MaRDI QIDQ1804637

Salvador Barberá, Bhaskar Dutta

Publication date: 1 April 1996

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(05)80002-8

zbMATH Keywords

two-sided matchingmechanismsprotective behaviorcollege-admissions modellexical maximin strategiesShapley-Shubik assignment model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08)

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