Vertigo: Comparing structural models of imperfect behavior in experimental games

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80004-1zbMath0821.90144OpenAlexW2033235575MaRDI QIDQ1804639

Mahmoud A. El-Gamal, Thomas R. Palfrey

Publication date: 15 May 1995

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(05)80004-1

zbMATH Keywords

one-sided incomplete informationgame of Vertigolearning in experimental games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Memory and learning in psychology (91E40) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (2)

Economical experiments: Bayesian efficient experimental design ⋮ An empirical model of strategic choice with an application to coordination games

Cites Work

• Imperfect equilibrium
• An experimental analysis of Nash refinements in signaling games
• Fictitious play: A statistical study of multiple economic experiments
• An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game

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