Coalitional manipulation in a quasilinear economy

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80005-3zbMath0833.90012MaRDI QIDQ1804641

Andrew N. Ermolov

Publication date: 15 May 1995

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

egalitarian mechanismsocial choice mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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