Two examples of strategic equilibrium

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80007-7zbMath0833.90130OpenAlexW2023517618MaRDI QIDQ1804643

Jean-Francois Mertens

Publication date: 15 May 1995

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(05)80007-7

zbMATH Keywords

strategic equilibriumquasi-perfect equilibriaunique subgame perfect equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (8)

The Computational Complexity of Trembling Hand Perfection and Other Equilibrium Refinements ⋮ Computational complexity of computing a quasi-proper equilibrium ⋮ Computing a quasi-perfect equilibrium of a two-player game ⋮ A characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria ⋮ On the equivalence between (quasi-)perfect and sequential equilibria ⋮ The complexity of computing a (quasi-)perfect equilibrium for an \(n\)-player extensive form game ⋮ The real computational complexity of minmax value and equilibrium refinements in multi-player games ⋮ On the topology of the set of Nash equilibria

Cites Work

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• A relation between perfect equilibria in extensive form games and proper equilibria in normal form games
• Acceptable and predominant correlated equilibria
• Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation. Part II. Discussion of the Definition, and Further Results
• Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

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