Implementation with extensive form games: one round of signaling is not enough

DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2546zbMath1073.91515OpenAlexW2058266084MaRDI QIDQ1806205

Sandro Brusco

Publication date: 20 December 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2546

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization ⋮ Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies ⋮ Perfect Bayesian implementation in economic environments

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
• Support restrictions and sequential equilibria
• Extensive form implementation in incomplete information environments
• Perfect sequential equilibrium
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Bayesian Implementation

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