A note on Matsushima's regularity condition

DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2545zbMath1073.91554OpenAlexW2010424778MaRDI QIDQ1806208

Kim-Sau Chung

Publication date: 20 December 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2545

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (6)

Balanced Bayesian mechanisms ⋮ Mechanism design with side payments: individual rationality and iterative dominance ⋮ Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information ⋮ Some Remarks on Bayesian Mechanism Design ⋮ Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus ⋮ Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces

Cites Work

• Incentive compatible mechanisms with full transferability
• Correlated types and Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms with budget balance
• Bayesian monotonicity with side payments

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