How to make sense of the common prior assumption under incomplete information
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Publication:1806332
DOI10.1007/s001820050117zbMath1115.91307OpenAlexW2027449534MaRDI QIDQ1806332
Klaus Nehring, Giacomo Bonanno
Publication date: 1 November 1999
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050117
Related Items (17)
Almost common priors ⋮ Finite order implications of common priors in infinite models ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Similarity of differential information with subjective prior beliefs ⋮ Agreeing to agree and Dutch books ⋮ The positive foundation of the common prior assumption ⋮ Countable spaces and common priors ⋮ Iterated expectations, compact spaces, and common priors ⋮ The veil of public ignorance ⋮ Common priors under endogenous uncertainty ⋮ RATIONALIZATION IN SIGNALING GAMES: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS ⋮ Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors ⋮ PEOPLE WITH COMMON PRIORS CAN AGREE TO DISAGREE ⋮ Assessing the truth axiom under incomplete information ⋮ On the logic and role of negative introspection of common belief ⋮ Agreeing to disagree with conditional probability systems ⋮ Characterizing the common prior assumption.
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