Capital accumulation subject to pollution control: Open-loop versus feedback investment strategies
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Publication:1808210
DOI10.1023/A:1018994716675zbMath0932.91040MaRDI QIDQ1808210
Publication date: 2 December 1999
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
differential gamepollutioninvestmentopen-loop Nash equilibriafeedback Nash equilibriatradeable emission permitsduopolistic competitionemission taxes
Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)
Related Items (5)
DYNAMICALLY CONSISTENT SOLUTION FOR A POLLUTION MANAGEMENT GAME IN COLLABORATIVE ABATEMENT WITH UNCERTAIN FUTURE PAYOFFS ⋮ Dynamic optimal control of transboundary pollution abatement under learning-by-doing depreciation ⋮ Dynamically consistent collaborative environmental management with production technique choices ⋮ Dynamically consistent cooperative solution in a differential game of transboundary industrial pollution ⋮ History-dependence in production-pollution-trade-off models: a multi-stage approach
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