Renegotiation design with multiple regulators
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Publication:1809491
DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2556zbMath0939.90010OpenAlexW1975081812MaRDI QIDQ1809491
Publication date: 25 November 1999
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2556
2-person games (91A05) Dynamic games (91A25) Theory of organizations, manpower planning in operations research (90B70)
Related Items (3)
On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting ⋮ On some agency costs of intermediated contracting ⋮ Common agency, organizational design and the hold-up problem
Cites Work
- Commitment and Fairness in a Dynamic Regulatory Relationship
- Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect
- Oversight of Long-Term Investment by Short-Lived Regulators
- Common Agency
- Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
- Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?
- Arm's Length Relationships
- Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement
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