Liberalism, efficiency, and stability: Some possibility results

DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2559zbMath0939.91033OpenAlexW4255851239MaRDI QIDQ1809492

van Hees, Martin

Publication date: 25 November 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2559

zbMATH Keywords

collective choicerightsliberal paradox

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (3)

A paradox of expert rights in abstract argumentation ⋮ A liberal paradox for judgment aggregation ⋮ The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games

Cites Work

• Tight and effectively rectangular game forms: A Nash solvable class
• Game forms, rights, and the efficiency of social outcomes
• Rectangularity and Tightness: A Normal Form Characterization of Perfect Information Extensive Game Forms
• Construction of Outcome Functions Guaranteeing Existence and Pareto Optimality of Nash Equilibria
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