Auction-like mechanisms for pricing excludable public goods

DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2560zbMath0965.91013OpenAlexW4214485253MaRDI QIDQ1809494

Laura Razzolini, Rajat K. Deb

Publication date: 1 February 2000

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2560

zbMATH Keywords

public goodsauctionstrategy-proof mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (20)

The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences ⋮ Strategy-proof rules for an excludable public good ⋮ Is Shapley cost sharing optimal? ⋮ The conservative equal costs rule, the serial cost sharing rule and the pivotal mechanism: asymptotic welfare loss comparisons for the case of an excludable public project ⋮ On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion ⋮ Strategy-proof cost sharing, ability to pay and free provision of an indivisible public good. ⋮ On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness ⋮ Coalition strategy-proof mechanisms for provision of excludable public goods. ⋮ An experimental evaluation of the serial cost sharing rule ⋮ On cost sharing in the provision of a binary and excludable public good ⋮ Strategy-proofness and public good provision using referenda based on unequal cost sharing ⋮ Cost-sharing mechanism for excludable goods with generalized non-rivalry ⋮ Is Shapley Cost Sharing Optimal? ⋮ Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size ⋮ Efficiency and exclusion in collective action allocations ⋮ Characterizations of strategy-proof mechanisms for excludable versus nonexcludable public projects ⋮ Voluntary cost sharing for an excludable public project ⋮ Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods ⋮ Auctioning a discrete public good under incomplete information ⋮ Welfare asymptotics of the pivotal mechanism for excludable public goods.

Cites Work

• Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders
• The conservative equal costs rule, the serial cost sharing rule and the pivotal mechanism: asymptotic welfare loss comparisons for the case of an excludable public project
• Voluntary cost sharing for an excludable public project
• Auctioning the provision of an indivisible public good
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Incentives in Teams
• Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
• Efficient Provision of a Discrete Public Good
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