Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
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Publication:1810425
DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(02)00018-2zbMath1044.91005OpenAlexW3122683188MaRDI QIDQ1810425
Publication date: 9 June 2003
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(02)00018-2
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