Open outcry auctions with secret reserve prices: An empirical application to executive auctions of tenant owner's apartments in Sweden
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Publication:1810668
DOI10.1016/S0304-4076(03)00084-8zbMath1031.91034MaRDI QIDQ1810668
Publication date: 9 June 2003
Published in: Journal of Econometrics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (2)
Secret reserve prices by uninformed sellers ⋮ Semi-nonparametric estimation of secret reserve prices in auctions
Cites Work
- Likelihood Ratio Tests for Model Selection and Non-Nested Hypotheses
- Deriving an estimate of the optimal reserve price: An application to British Columbian timber sales
- Bidding off the wall: Why reserve prices may be kept secret
- Dominance or maximin: How to solve an English auction
- Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Misspecified Models
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