Open outcry auctions with secret reserve prices: An empirical application to executive auctions of tenant owner's apartments in Sweden

DOI10.1016/S0304-4076(03)00084-8zbMath1031.91034MaRDI QIDQ1810668

Matias Eklöf, Anders Lunander

Publication date: 9 June 2003

Published in: Journal of Econometrics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

English auctionReserve priceStructural estimation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Secret reserve prices by uninformed sellers ⋮ Semi-nonparametric estimation of secret reserve prices in auctions

Cites Work

• Likelihood Ratio Tests for Model Selection and Non-Nested Hypotheses
• Deriving an estimate of the optimal reserve price: An application to British Columbian timber sales
• Bidding off the wall: Why reserve prices may be kept secret
• Dominance or maximin: How to solve an English auction
• Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Misspecified Models

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