Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation
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Publication:1810692
DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(02)00017-0zbMath1032.91065OpenAlexW3123791958MaRDI QIDQ1810692
Publication date: 9 June 2003
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(02)00017-0
Financial applications of other theories (91G80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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