On the duality between prior beliefs and trading demands
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Publication:1810694
DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(02)00033-9zbMath1032.91091OpenAlexW2155668302MaRDI QIDQ1810694
Publication date: 9 June 2003
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(02)00033-9
Related Items (9)
``Agreeing to disagree type results: a decision-theoretic approach. ⋮ The cycles approach ⋮ Pareto optima and equilibria when preferences are incompletely known ⋮ Agreeing to agree and Dutch books ⋮ Speculation under unawareness ⋮ Interim efficient allocations under uncertainty ⋮ From posteriors to priors via cycles ⋮ Rational expectations can preclude trades ⋮ Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria
Cites Work
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- Information, trade and common knowledge
- Common priors and separation of convex sets
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- Don't Bet on it: Contingent Agreements with Asymmetric Information
- On the Possibility of Speculation under Rational Expectations
- Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information
- Sharing Beliefs: Between Agreeing and Disagreeing
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
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