Stable matchings and the small core in Nash equilibrium in the college admissions problem.
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Publication:1811235
DOI10.1007/s100580200063zbMath1055.91003OpenAlexW1502787658MaRDI QIDQ1811235
Publication date: 2002
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1247.pdf
Related Items (10)
Dynamics in tree formation games ⋮ Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems ⋮ Matching markets under (in)complete information ⋮ A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem' ⋮ A further note on the college admission game ⋮ Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching ⋮ Two-Sided Matching Models ⋮ Random matching in the college admissions problem ⋮ Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems ⋮ The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP)
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