Who else is bidding? The Pareto optimality of disclosing bidder identities.

DOI10.1007/S100580200070zbMath1051.91020OpenAlexW1557500928MaRDI QIDQ1811237

Gopal Das Varma

Publication date: 14 October 2003

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580200070

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyauctionmechanism designexternalities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Information disclosure in auctions with downstream competition

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