Constitutional implementation.

DOI10.1007/s100580200074zbMath1048.91043OpenAlexW4232156455MaRDI QIDQ1811240

Bezalel Peleg, Eyal Winter

Publication date: 2002

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580200074

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumeffectivity functionconstitution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Social choice (91B14)

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