Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation.
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Publication:1811244
DOI10.1007/s100580200073zbMath1048.91040OpenAlexW1566671037MaRDI QIDQ1811244
Pierre Favardin, Dominique Lepelley, Jérôme Serais
Publication date: 2002
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580200073
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