Ambiguity in election games

DOI10.1007/S100580200081zbMath1046.91033OpenAlexW3122007203MaRDI QIDQ1811245

Enriqueta Aragonès, Andrew Postlewaite

Publication date: 2002

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10230/793

zbMATH Keywords

equilibriumvoters

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (3)

Vagueness in multidimensional proposals ⋮ Polarization and inefficient information aggregation under strategic voting ⋮ Making statements and approval voting

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