How two-party competition treats minorities

DOI10.1007/s100580200083zbMath1046.91005OpenAlexW2045425337MaRDI QIDQ1811249

Jean-François Laslier

Publication date: 2002

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580200083

zbMATH Keywords

equilibriumDownsian electoral competitionPlurality game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Voting theory (91B12)

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Generalizations of the General Lotto and Colonel Blotto games ⋮ Can the majority lose the election? ⋮ \(N\)-dimensional Blotto game with heterogeneous battlefield values ⋮ Pure strategy Nash equilibria in non-zero sum Colonel Blotto games ⋮ An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games ⋮ All-pay \(2\times 2\) Hex: a multibattle contest with complementarities ⋮ The non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game ⋮ Waging simple wars: a complete characterization of two-battlefield Blotto equilibria ⋮ The Colonel Blotto game ⋮ The multiplayer Colonel Blotto game ⋮ In Silico Voting Experiments

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