The asymptotic strategyproofness of scoring and Condorcet consistent rules

DOI10.1007/s100580200077zbMath1046.91034OpenAlexW2004206661MaRDI QIDQ1811251

Zvika Neeman, Eyal Baharad

Publication date: 2002

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580200077

zbMATH Keywords

voting rulepreference profiles

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Individual preferences (91B08)

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Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem ⋮ How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election? ⋮ Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules ⋮ Control complexity in Bucklin and fallback voting: an experimental analysis ⋮ Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour

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