Optimal scrutiny in multi-period promotion tournaments.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00546-8zbMath1048.91026OpenAlexW2051988713MaRDI QIDQ1811547

Pradeep Dubey, Ori Haimanko

Publication date: 17 June 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(02)00546-8

zbMATH Keywords

subgame pefect equilibriaundominated sample size

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Decision theory for games (91A35)

Related Items (6)

Eliciting performance: deterministic versus proportional prizes ⋮ The limits of meritocracy ⋮ Equivalence of optimal noisy-ranking contests and Tullock contests ⋮ Tournaments with midterm reviews ⋮ Information manipulation and competition ⋮ Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort

Cites Work

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• Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games: I
• Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort

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