Hiding information in electoral competition.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00531-6zbMath1048.91024OpenAlexW1990837819MaRDI QIDQ1811550

Johan Lagerlöf, Paul Heidhues

Publication date: 17 June 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(02)00531-6

zbMATH Keywords

correlationinformation transmissionperfect Bayesian equilibriumprivate signals

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (12)

Private polling in elections and voter welfare ⋮ Electoral competition with privately-informed candidates ⋮ Vagueness in multidimensional proposals ⋮ Polarization and pandering in common-interest elections ⋮ Wisdom of the crowd? Information aggregation in representative democracy ⋮ Risky shifts as multi-sender signaling ⋮ Reputation and news suppression in the media industry ⋮ Pandering and electoral competition ⋮ An experimental study of truth-telling in a sender-receiver game ⋮ Polarization and inefficient information aggregation under strategic voting ⋮ RETROSPECTIVE VOTING AND PARTY POLARIZATION ⋮ Information and targeted spending

Cites Work

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• Moral hazard and private monitoring
• Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
• A Model of Expertise
• Strategic Information Transmission
• The Politics of Persuasion when Voters Are Rational
• Polarization and Inefficient Policies

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