A wide range no-regret theorem
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Publication:1811553
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00032-0zbMath1032.91038MaRDI QIDQ1811553
Publication date: 17 June 2003
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (13)
Approachability in population games ⋮ Learning correlated equilibria in games with compact sets of strategies ⋮ Approachability with bounded memory ⋮ Robust mean field games ⋮ Dynamic benchmark targeting ⋮ \(\lambda \)-perceptron: an adaptive classifier for data streams ⋮ No-regret algorithms in on-line learning, games and convex optimization ⋮ Approachability, regret and calibration: implications and equivalences ⋮ Regret minimization in repeated matrix games with variable stage duration ⋮ Repeated Games with Incomplete Information ⋮ Note on universal conditional consistency ⋮ A Robust Saturated Strategy for $n$-Player Prisoner's Dilemma ⋮ Calibration and Internal No-Regret with Random Signals
Cites Work
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- An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs
- Coherent behavior in noncooperative games
- Lower equilibrium payoffs in two-player repeated games with non- observable actions
- Regret in the on-line decision problem
- Conditional universal consistency.
- Minimizing regret: The general case
- Existence of Correlated Equilibria
- A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
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