The demand bargaining set: General characterization and application to majority games

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00532-8zbMath1032.91021OpenAlexW2016904081MaRDI QIDQ1811555

Massimo Morelli, Maria Montero

Publication date: 17 June 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(02)00532-8

zbMATH Keywords

Majority gamesBargaining setsProportional payoffsStable demandsUndominated coalition structures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (6)

An adaptive model of demand adjustment in weighted majority games ⋮ Coalitional games and contracts based on individual deviations ⋮ Demand bargaining and proportional payoffs in majority games ⋮ A bargaining set for monotonic simple games based on external and internal stability ⋮ Non-cooperative bargaining in apex games and the kernel. ⋮ USING THE ASPIRATION CORE TO PREDICT COALITION FORMATION

Cites Work

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• The aspiration approach to predicting coalition formation and payoff distribution in sidepayment games
• On Weights of Constant-Sum Majority Games
• The kernel of a cooperative game
• Existence of stable payoff configurations for cooperative games

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