An extension of the \(\tau\)-value to games with coalition structures.

DOI10.1016/S0377-2217(02)00426-5zbMath1083.91013MaRDI QIDQ1811994

Margarita Vázquez-Brage, Anne van den Nouweland, Balbina V. Casas Méndez, Ignacio Garcia-Jurado

Publication date: 18 June 2003

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

\(\tau\)-valueTU-gamesBankruptcy problemsAirport games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (15)

Component-wise proportional solutions for communication graph games ⋮ On egalitarian values for cooperative games with a priori unions ⋮ Allocation rules for cooperative games with restricted communication and a priori unions based on the Myerson value and the average tree solution ⋮ A solution for bargaining problems with coalition structure ⋮ Revenue sharing of green agricultural structural coalition based on Selectope ⋮ Two efficient values of cooperative games with graph structure based on \(\tau\)-values ⋮ Convex and exact games with non-transferable utility ⋮ Two-step Shapley-solidarity value for cooperative games with coalition structure ⋮ Optimal coalition formation and surplus distribution: two sides of one coin ⋮ Balancedness conditions for exact games ⋮ Decentralized rationing problems and the proportional rule ⋮ On the core, the Weber set and convexity in games with a priori unions ⋮ The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure ⋮ COALITIONAL VALUES AND COST ALLOCATION PROBLEMS ⋮ The constrained equal awards rule for bankruptcy problems with a priori unions

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• A quadratic programming model for product configuration optimization
• The Shapley Value as Aircraft Landing Fees–Revisited
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