On some combinatorial problems arising in the theory of voting games

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(90)90060-KzbMath0738.90006OpenAlexW1985850051MaRDI QIDQ1813696

Michel Le Breton

Publication date: 25 June 1992

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(90)90060-k

zbMATH Keywords

corenon-emptiness of the stability setqualified majority gamesquota voting games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

ON THE CHACTERISTIC NUMBERS OF VOTING GAMES ⋮ Cooperation, stability and social welfare under majority rule ⋮ SOCIAL CHOICE AND COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY: VOTING GAMES AS SOCIAL AGGREGATION FUNCTIONS

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
• The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results
• The capacity of a committee
• Stability of decision systems under majority rule
• \(n\)-person games with only 1, \(n-1\), and \(n\)-person permissible coalitions
• Implementation of Democratic Social Choice Functions
• n-Person games with only 1, n? 1, and n-person coalitions

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