Internal correlation in repeated games

DOI10.1007/BF01766432zbMath0747.90119MaRDI QIDQ1814186

Ehud Lehrer

Publication date: 25 June 1992

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationinformation structurefolk theoremsNash equilibrium payoffstwo-player, undiscounted, infinitely repeated games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (23)

Correlated equilibria of two person repeated games with random signals ⋮ Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals ⋮ Subjective games and equilibria ⋮ Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games ⋮ Mediated talk ⋮ Transforming monitoring structures with resilient encoders -- application to repeated games ⋮ What you get is what you see: cooperation in repeated games with observable payoffs ⋮ Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring ⋮ Communication in Cournot oligopoly ⋮ When (not) to publicize inspection results ⋮ A detail-free mediator ⋮ Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. ⋮ Comparison of information structures ⋮ An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information ⋮ On the equilibrium payoffs set of two player repeated games with imperfect monitoring ⋮ Correlated Equilibria and Communication in Games ⋮ Repeated Games with Complete Information ⋮ The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs ⋮ The truth behind the myth of the folk theorem ⋮ Secure protocols of how communication generates correlation ⋮ On non-Nash equilibria ⋮ Nash equilibria of repeated games with observable payoff vectors ⋮ How to play with a biased coin?

Cites Work

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• Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard
• Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
• Lower equilibrium payoffs in two-player repeated games with non- observable actions
• An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• A note on the L-P formulation of zero-sum sequential games with incomplete information
• Nash equilibria of \(n\)-player repeated games with semi-standard information
• Universal Mechanisms
• Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting
• Two-Player Repeated Games with Nonobservable Actions and Observable Payoffs
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information

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