The consistency principle for games in strategic form

DOI10.1007/BF01254381zbMath0856.90147OpenAlexW2169923645MaRDI QIDQ1814778

Bezalel Peleg, S. H. Tijs

Publication date: 31 October 1996

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01254381

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumaxiomatic characterizationone-person rationality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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