Equivalence between bargaining sets and the core in simple games

DOI10.1007/BF01254385zbMath0856.90144OpenAlexW1984490742MaRDI QIDQ1814783

David Wettstein, Ezra Einy

Publication date: 31 October 1996

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01254385

zbMATH Keywords

core of simple gamesseveral notions of bargaining sets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (7)

Core equivalence theorems for infinite convex games ⋮ A characterization of convex TU games by means of the Mas-Colell bargaining set (à la Shimomura) ⋮ The core and the steady bargaining set for convex games ⋮ The Lovász extension of market games ⋮ The bargaining set for sharing the power ⋮ An implementation-theoretic approach to non-cooperative foundations ⋮ The bargaining set for almost-convex games

Cites Work

• An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set
• A consistent bargaining set
• Super-modularity: Applications to convex games and to the greedy algorithm for LP
• On the sensitivity of von Neumann and Morgenstern abstract stable sets: The stable and the individual stable bargaining set
• Cores of convex games
• The kernel and bargaining set for convex games
• Markets with a Continuum of Traders
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