The approximation of a strong perfect equilibrium in a discounted supergame

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(94)00711-XzbMath0855.90149OpenAlexW2137856279MaRDI QIDQ1814806

Milan Horniaček

Publication date: 24 November 1996

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(94)00711-x

zbMATH Keywords

strong perfect equilibriumdiscounted supergameoligopolistic supergamessemi-strict versionweakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (1)

Simple coalitional strategy profiles in repeated games

Cites Work

• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
• Renegotiation in repeated games
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Renegotiation-proof equilibria in repeated prisoners' dilemma
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information

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