An algorithm for checking strong Nash implementability

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(94)00712-8zbMath0858.90008OpenAlexW1998673126MaRDI QIDQ1814807

Sang-Chul Suh

Publication date: 23 March 1997

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(94)00712-8

zbMATH Keywords

social choice correspondenceMaskin monotonicityimplementability of a correspondencestrong (Nash) implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (5)

Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: an application of the minimax theorem ⋮ A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems ⋮ Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization ⋮ Double implementation in Nash and \(M\)-Nash equilibria ⋮ An algorithm for verifying double implementability in Nash and strong Nash equilibria

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
• Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
• Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
• On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation

This page was built for publication: An algorithm for checking strong Nash implementability