Collinearity between the Shapley value and the egalitarian division rules for cooperative games

DOI10.1007/BF01539733zbMath0858.90144MaRDI QIDQ1814872

Yukihiko Funaki, Irinel Dragan, Theo S. H. Driessen

Publication date: 31 October 1996

Published in: OR Spektrum (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valueunanimity gamesegalitarian division ruleslandlord gamesPAW-gamesproportional average worth game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (4)

Ordinal equivalence of values, Pigou-Dalton transfers and inequality in TU-games ⋮ Generalizations of Sobolev's consistency and values for TU-games ⋮ On the semivalues and the least square values average per capita formulas and relationships ⋮ THE EGALITARIAN NON-k-AVERAGED CONTRIBUTION (EN^kAC-) VALUE FOR TU-GAMES

Cites Work

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• Properties of 1-convex \(n\)-person games
• Allocating joint costs by means of the nucleolus
• The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods
• Upper and lower bounds of the kernel and nucleolus
• Coincidence of and collinearity between game theoretic solutions

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