Reputation with observed actions
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Publication:1814938
DOI10.1007/BF01213658zbMath0858.90149MaRDI QIDQ1814938
Publication date: 3 November 1996
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (2)
When are nonanonymous players negligible? ⋮ Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information
Cites Work
- On the robustness of equilibrium refinements
- Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
- Reputation and imperfect information
- Reputation and dynamic Stackelberg leadership in infinitely repeated games
- Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
- Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
- Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent
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