Constant scoring rules, Condorcet criteria and single-peaked preferences
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1814942
DOI10.1007/BF01213662zbMath0858.90004MaRDI QIDQ1814942
Publication date: 1996
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
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- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
