The production and cost-sharing of an excludable public good

DOI10.1007/BF01213665zbMath0858.90030MaRDI QIDQ1814944

Benny Moldovanu

Publication date: 3 November 1996

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

negotiationpublic goodcoalition formationstationary strategiessubgame-perfect Nash equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (2)

An efficient and egalitarian negotiation procedure for economies with externalities ⋮ Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods

Cites Work

• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria and the core in three-player games
• How to share the cost of a public good
• The demand commitment bargaining and snowballing cooperation
• Order independent equilibria
• Nonmanipulable Cores
• An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
• Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions
• A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core
• Joint Projects without Commitment
• A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
• Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods

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