On randomized matching mechanisms
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Publication:1814960
DOI10.1007/S001990050097zbMath0859.90009OpenAlexW4230373552MaRDI QIDQ1814960
Publication date: 12 December 1996
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050097
Related Items (17)
Corrigendum to ``On randomized matching mechanisms [Econ. Theory 8 (1996) 377--381] ⋮ Random path to stability in a decentralized market with contracts ⋮ Paths to stability for matching markets with couples ⋮ Gender consistent resolving rules in marriage problems ⋮ Analysis of stochastic matching markets ⋮ The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods ⋮ The stable marriage problem: an interdisciplinary review from the physicist's perspective ⋮ Paths to stability in two-sided matching under uncertainty ⋮ Paths to stability and uniqueness in two-sided matching markets ⋮ Stable secretaries ⋮ The dynamics of stable matchings and half-matchings for the stable marriage and roommates problems ⋮ On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems ⋮ Random paths to stability in the roommate problem ⋮ Median stable matching for college admissions ⋮ Sequential entry in many-to-one matching markets ⋮ On the Stable Matchings That Can Be Reached When the Agents Go Marching in One By One ⋮ Deferred Acceptance with Compensation Chains
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