Efficient equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1815195
DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.0076zbMath0859.90138OpenAlexW2078764681MaRDI QIDQ1815195
Fernando Vega-Redondo, Arthur J. Robson
Publication date: 7 November 1996
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/vega-robson.pdf
Cooperative games (91A12) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Memory and learning in psychology (91E40)
Related Items (75)
Stochastic sampling of interaction partners versus deterministic payoff assignment ⋮ Match choice and Ghettoization in evolutionary games ⋮ The value of a coordination game ⋮ Long-run equilibria with dominated strategies ⋮ ON THE SURVIVAL OF COOPERATION UNDER DIFFERENT MATCHING SCHEMES ⋮ A dynamic model of equilibrium selection in signaling markets ⋮ Rapid evolution under inertia ⋮ Bandwagon effects and constrained network formation ⋮ Constrained mobility and the evolution of efficient outcomes ⋮ Muddling through: Noisy equilibrium selection ⋮ Large population limits for evolutionary dynamics with random matching ⋮ An evolutionary interpretation of mixed-strategy equilibria ⋮ The evolution of conventions under condition-dependent mistakes ⋮ Imitation, local interaction, and coordination ⋮ Efficiency and stochastic stability in normal form games ⋮ Competing conventions ⋮ Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations with strong selection and weak mutation ⋮ The evolution of conventions in the presence of social competition ⋮ Information, interaction and memory ⋮ Learning, bounded memory, and inertia ⋮ International environmental agreements under an evolutionary mechanism of imitation and asymmetric countries ⋮ Errors can increase cooperation in finite populations ⋮ Aspiration adaptation in the ultimatum minigame. ⋮ Population dynamics with a stable efficient equilibrium ⋮ Linking friction, social coordination and the speed of evolution ⋮ Stochastic replicator dynamics: a theoretical analysis and an experimental assessment ⋮ Equilibrium Selection in Evolutionary Games with Imperfect Monitoring ⋮ Popularity of reinforcement-based and belief-based learning models: an evolutionary approach ⋮ Coordination under global random interaction and local imitation ⋮ Imitation with asymmetric memory ⋮ A finite population ESS and a long run equilibrium in an \(n\) players coordination game ⋮ Imitation and the role of information in overcoming coordination failures ⋮ Unfolding social hierarchies ⋮ Evolutionary Game Theory ⋮ Matching, imitation, and coordination in networks ⋮ Local interactions under switching costs ⋮ When are efficient conventions selected in networks? ⋮ Stochasticity and time delays in evolutionary games ⋮ Robust stochastic stability ⋮ THE DYNAMICS OF NORMS AND CONVENTIONS UNDER LOCAL INTERACTIONS AND IMITATION ⋮ Rule evolution and equilibrium selection ⋮ Nash equilibrium and the evolution of preferences ⋮ On the observational equivalence of random matching ⋮ Learning in games by random sampling ⋮ Stochastic imitation in finite games ⋮ Network characteristics enabling efficient coordination: a simulation study ⋮ Network formation and social coordination ⋮ An introduction to \textit{ABED}: agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics ⋮ Cycles versus equilibrium in evolutionary games ⋮ The evolution of focal points ⋮ Stochastic stability in networks with decay ⋮ Imitation, Group Selection and Cooperation ⋮ Finite Population Dynamics and Mixed Equilibria ⋮ The Price of Stochastic Anarchy ⋮ Experimental evidence of behavioral improvement by learning and intermediate advice ⋮ Random matching in adaptive dynamics ⋮ BARGAINING POWER IN THE NASH DEMAND GAME AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH ⋮ Cooperation through imitation ⋮ Equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching of players ⋮ Boundedly rational quasi-Bayesian learning in coordination games with imperfect monitoring ⋮ Perfect foresight and equilibrium selection in symmetric potential games ⋮ REPUTATION BY IMITATION: AN EVOLUTIONARY MODEL WITH STRATEGIC MATCHING ⋮ Stochastically stable states in an oligopoly with differentiated goods: Equivalence of price and quantity strategies ⋮ Learning efficient equilibria in repeated games ⋮ Coordination problems on networks revisited: statics and dynamics ⋮ Coordination games on dynamical networks ⋮ Local interaction on random graphs ⋮ Coordination games and local interactions: a survey of the game theoretic literature ⋮ Long-run technology choice with endogenous local capacity ⋮ Binary games with state dependent stochastic choice ⋮ Evolutionary multiplayer games ⋮ Stochastic stability in three-player games with time delays ⋮ Evolution in games with endogenous mistake probabilities. ⋮ Learning correlated equilibria in population games. ⋮ Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games with local interaction and best-response dynamics
This page was built for publication: Efficient equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching
