The evolutionary stability of auctions over bargaining

DOI10.1006/game.1996.0067zbMath0859.90062OpenAlexW2004067989MaRDI QIDQ1815582

R. Preston McAfee, Xiaohua Lu

Publication date: 18 November 1996

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/6f821e511fff3890f531497d1f615445ff740205

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsbargainingequilibrium in transaction mechanismshomogeneous buyers and sellers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (7)

Bargaining with incomplete information: evolutionary stability in finite populations ⋮ ADVERSE SELECTION IN DYNAMIC MATCHING MARKETS ⋮ Physical search ⋮ Scale returns of a random matching model ⋮ Dual mechanism for an online retailer ⋮ Evolutionary stability of auction and supply chain contracting: an analysis based on disintermediation in the Indian tea supply chains ⋮ Equivalence of auctions and posted prices

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