A note on reputation: more on the chain-store paradox

DOI10.1006/game.1996.0059zbMath0860.90041OpenAlexW1991668849MaRDI QIDQ1816396

Jordi Massó

Publication date: 26 November 1996

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/f474f7c9fdb1931264ee9179618ca78d73731ecf

zbMATH Keywords

imperfect informationsequential equilibriachain-store paradox

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (2)

Multiple rounds in a chain store game ⋮ REPUTATION BY IMITATION: AN EVOLUTIONARY MODEL WITH STRATEGIC MATCHING

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