Another approach to mutation and learning games

DOI10.1006/game.1996.0041zbMath0862.90136OpenAlexW1980903745MaRDI QIDQ1817251

Siegfried K. Berninghaus, Madjid Amir

Publication date: 1 December 1996

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0041

zbMATH Keywords

continuous timedynamic steady-state equilibriaevolutionary normal-form gamepresence of mutations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Memory and learning in psychology (91E40) Model systems in control theory (93C99)

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