Voting over investment

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(95)00765-2zbMath0860.90021OpenAlexW2008826553MaRDI QIDQ1817336

Richard T. Boylan

Publication date: 21 April 1997

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(95)00765-2

zbMATH Keywords

capital accumulationgrowth modeldemocratic processdifferent endowmentsdifferent time preferencesmajority vote equilibriasupermajority equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (1)

Political competition in a model of economic growth: Some theoretical results

Cites Work

• An integration of equilibrium theory and turnpike theory
• Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
• Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point
• Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives
• The Existence of Ramsey Equilibrium
• Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule
• Linear Statistical Inference and its Applications

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