Constraints on reciprocity for non-sessile organisms

DOI10.1007/BF02459487zbMath0856.92025OpenAlexW4243136544MaRDI QIDQ1817464

Michael J. Childress, Michael Mesterton-Gibbons

Publication date: 24 February 1997

Published in: Bulletin of Mathematical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02459487

zbMATH Keywords

finite populationiterated prisoner's dilemmagroup formationallogroomingbenefit/cost ratiocooperative behaviorsgame-theoretic models of reciprocitynon-sessile organismsprobability of further interactionprobability of partner retentionstable reciprocity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Animal behavior (92D50)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• On the iterated prisoner's dilemma in a finite population
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• MORE SPATIAL GAMES
• THE SPATIAL DILEMMAS OF EVOLUTION

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