Efficient strategy-proof allocation functions in linear production economies

DOI10.1007/s001990050341zbMath0965.91025OpenAlexW2035123125MaRDI QIDQ1817964

Yves Sprumont, François Maniquet

Publication date: 14 December 2000

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1866/455

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencystrategy-proofnesslinear production set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production models (90B30) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (10)

Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems ⋮ Strategy-proofness and efficiency are incompatible in production economies ⋮ Profit sharing in unique Nash equilibrium: characterization in the two-agent case ⋮ Strategy-proofness in linear production economies with homothetic or quasi-linear preferences ⋮ Cost Sharing in Production Economies ⋮ Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on the cobb-Douglas domain of exchange economies ⋮ A mechanism design approach to allocating central government funds among regional development agencies ⋮ Strategy-proof risk sharing ⋮ Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size ⋮ Cooperative production and efficiency

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