Nash equilibrium without mutual knowledge of rationality

DOI10.1007/s001990050344zbMath0952.91006OpenAlexW2068103137MaRDI QIDQ1817968

Kin Chung Lo

Publication date: 1999

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.economics.utoronto.ca/public/workingPapers/UT-ECIPA-ECPAP-95-04.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriummutual knowledge of rationalitycautious equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Individual preferences (91B08)

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