Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies: a note.

DOI10.1007/s001990050348zbMath1078.91528OpenAlexW1966714009MaRDI QIDQ1817973

Shinji Ohseto, Rajat K. Deb

Publication date: 1999

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050348

zbMATH Keywords

Strategy-proofnessIndividual rationalityNon-bossiness.Social choice function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (6)

Strategy-proof cost sharing, ability to pay and free provision of an indivisible public good. ⋮ Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods ⋮ A Hurwicz type result in a model with public good production ⋮ Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation ⋮ Cooperative production and efficiency ⋮ Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear

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