The role of absolute continuity in merging of opinions and rational learning
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Publication:1818293
zbMath0996.91026MaRDI QIDQ1818293
Chris William Sanchirico, Ronald I. Miller
Publication date: 1 February 2000
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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Cites Work
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- Merging of Opinions with Increasing Information
- Prediction, Optimization, and Learning in Repeated Games
- Compatible Measures and Merging
- A Probabilistic Model of Learning in Games
