Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information
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Publication:1818297
DOI10.1006/game.1999.0722zbMath0972.91014OpenAlexW2071679986MaRDI QIDQ1818297
Publication date: 4 January 2000
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0722
Related Items (15)
Bounded memory and permanent reputations ⋮ Testing theories with learnable and predictive representations ⋮ Reputation, incomplete information, and differences in patience in repeated games with multiple equilibria ⋮ Bayesian repeated games and reputation ⋮ Nonmanipulable Bayesian testing ⋮ When is reputation bad? ⋮ Preface: Special issue in honor of the 60th birthday of Sylvain Sorin ⋮ A prequential test for exchangeable theories ⋮ Impermanent types and permanent reputations ⋮ Repeated Games with Incomplete Information ⋮ Entropy bounds on Bayesian learning ⋮ Strategic learning in games with symmetric information. ⋮ Reputation effects in stochastic games with two long-lived players ⋮ Learning (to disagree?) in large worlds ⋮ Disappearance of reputations in two-sided incomplete-information games
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