Refined inequalities for stable marriage

DOI10.1023/A:1026453915989zbMath1028.91530OpenAlexW1594069552MaRDI QIDQ1818351

Brian Aldershof, David C. Lorenc, Olivia M. Carducci

Publication date: 4 January 2000

Published in: Constraints (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1026453915989

zbMATH Keywords

linear inequalitiesstable marriage problemproposal algorithmspruned preference listsstable matching polytope

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (8)

Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems ⋮ The computational complexity of random serial dictatorship ⋮ The stable marriage problem: an interdisciplinary review from the physicist's perspective ⋮ Fractional matching markets ⋮ Median stable matching for college admissions ⋮ On the Stable Matchings That Can Be Reached When the Agents Go Marching in One By One ⋮ EMPLOYMENT BY LOTTO REVISITED ⋮ Deferred Acceptance with Compensation Chains

This page was built for publication: Refined inequalities for stable marriage